'No Evidence'

The Prime Minister was demonstrably wrong about Southport

The summer of 2024; Sir Keir Starmer assured the BBC the far right was a ‘very real threat.’

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In 2010, an altercation in a Tunisian marketplace led to disturbances from Morocco to Oman. This ‘Arab Spring’ was a spontaneous eruption of anger, prompted by government impotence, corruption and authoritarianism. It would, many hoped, be an Arab version of the ‘Velvet Revolutions’ after the Soviet Union’s collapse. Sadly it wasn’t to be, but that’s another story.

Nonetheless, the Arab ‘Street’ had spoken, causing political shockwaves across the world. As a phenomenon, the Street is often stereotyped in the West as mob behaviour. Which it most assuredly isn’t; the Middle-Eastern Street is a time-honoured mechanism for the marginalised to display their dissatisfaction - wise rulers heed its whispers, sighs and growls.

It also reminds me of the reasoning sometimes heard after rioting by minority communities in the UK prompted by, for example, a police shooting. It’s a righteous spark. The arson and looting? That’s collateral. Opportunism. What did you expect? You might, of course, simply argue left-wing tropes and apologia are being trousered by the other side. The Street? We’re talking about Merseyside, not Marrakesh.

Nonetheless, for argument’s sake, let’s run with the ball; would it mean we’re heading towards a situation where disorder becomes the default expression of dissatisfaction by the white majority? Then, eventually? Someone adds wall murals, balaclavas and flute bands. Oh, and a car boot full of guns and petrol bombs.

Ulster Defence Association paramilitaries; the ‘Ulster Street?’

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In August 2024, after rioting across the UK, Sir Keir Starmer assured us these disturbances were a consequence of right-wing thuggery. As Laurie Wastell wrote;

Three days into the disorder on 1 August, the Prime Minister told the country that the unrest we were seeing was the work of ‘gang[s] of thugs’ who had travelled to ‘a community that is not their own’ to smash it up; ‘far-right thugs’ would become his mantra. He also said the violence was ‘clearly whipped up online’, prompting a fierce crackdown on online speech. Even Department for Education guidance from late August followed this narrative. In a post suggesting how to how to talk to schoolchildren about what had happened, the department wrote that, ‘rioting coordinated by right-wing extremists was initiated by the spread of misinformation about the perpetrator of the Southport attack resulting in violent, racist and Islamophobic attacks on our communities by extremists’.

Then, in May 2025, the second tranche of His Majesty's Directorate of Constabulary's report, into police intelligence failings during the riots, concluded;

During our inspection, we found no conclusive or compelling evidence that the 2024 disorder was deliberately premeditated and co-ordinated by any specific group or network…. most offenders were local to the disorder and had no connection to extremism We found that it was mostly disaffected individuals, influencers or groups that incited people to act violently and take part in disorder, rather than criminal factions or extremists. And it was mainly unrelated to their ideology or political views.

The report demonstrates how the PM’s line was, at best, spin. It also reveals how the police gave up on monitoring non-terrorist related extremism. As I wrote at the time;

Most of those appearing in court appear to be listless members of the underclass, from forgotten-about post-industrial towns. Or buffoons who simply enjoy violence… interestingly, the majority of those arrested, according to CPS stats, live close to the areas they rioted in. This is deeply significant; if you honestly think the modern-day extreme-right has a network of sleeper cells waiting to spring into action upon receiving a TikTok message, then I’ve got a bridge to sell you.

The HMICFRS report, therefore, is a stinging rebuke to Sir Keir Starmer. I’m not generally a critic of HMICFRS either, being the organisation responsible for reviewing police performance. Sir Andy Cooke, who heads the inspectorate, is a deeply experienced and decent man.

The report’s significant, as was the Prime Minister’s take on Southport; if our response to monitoring possible disorder is based on a flawed premise, it stands to reason the police response will be flawed too. I’m also troubled by the Government’s heavy-handed and illiberal attitude to policing social media - this report will be used to justify further legislation concerning our online freedoms.

Nonetheless, the truth the HMICFRS report reveals - one of widespread nativist discontent - is as disturbing as the illusory spectre of neo-fascist insurrection. Which is, and always was, delusional. Except, now, Police and Government have a name for the phenomena: Cultural Nationalism. This isn’t to say the term only applies to the white majority. For example, I would presume (for example) members of the UK’s Indian or Pakistani communities skirmishing over faraway disputes would also fall into this category.

Nonetheless, I find the term revealing. To my mind, it reinforces the notion of a balkanised UK. The white working class (or, perhaps, underclass) is now simply one of many other competing cultural groups. In our age of identity politics (which future historians might compare to Lenin clambering aboard his carriage at the Finland Station), do the authorities anticipate an increase in ‘indigenous’ disorder?

Anarchy in the UK - a football flag, anarchist graffiti and a Guy Fawkes mask; ‘cultural nationalism’ is inchoate and nativist, not structured and ideological.

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This essay builds on a few others I’ve written. I include them in case any readers are interested:

• 1848 and all that. An overview of British public order policing.

• Does the Met have an appeasement problem? and Losing while appearing to win? The Met, politics and London’s pro-Palestine marches.

• The Ghosts of Fascists past. Right wing extremism in the UK, and the misunderstanding thereof, in the context of the 2024 riots and Standing armies, being Keir Starmer’s national ‘gendarmerie’ (spoiler - as I predicted, it didn’t happen).

• Eating soup with a knife. The challenges of domestic intelligence gathering in a Balkanised Britain and Thinking the Unthinkable, on Prof. David Betz’s predictions of civil war in western societies.

• The Melchetts of Marsham Street. Observations on the post-Southport Home Office report into extremism. I’m not saying my piece is unnervingly accurate, but civil servants wondered if I’d planted a bug in their office.

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Now, onto the Tranche 2 report, which discovered;

The police service didn’t sufficiently prioritise intelligence on disorder, even though the Strategic Policing Requirement includes it as one of the most significant threats to public safety. We also found that forces didn’t always monitor, collect, classify or use disorder-related intelligence effectively.

I’m not going to go into my usual ‘Special Branch used to perform that role until they murdered it’ routine, except, er… Special Branch used to perform that role until they murdered it. We warned them of the consequences, but there were no tea and medals to be had in the world of public order intelligence or domestic extremism. Prevent? It turned policing into process-mapped social work.

The police have never possessed a crystal ball for predicting disorder. Gathering such intelligence is an art rather than a science, involving dedicated staff, expertise and time. It also requires boots on the ground, in the form of police officers actually interacting with communities. Two things which, in the modern police force, are conspicuous by their absence.

Now, this article isn’t about how to run a public order intelligence desk - that would require a book - but the HMICFRS report’s tone is instructive. Senior officers seemed genuinely startled to learn their forces had no capacity for gauging community tension. ‘Where’s the intelligence?’ They cried, wondering who’d hidden the crystal ball. It was if 2011 never happened.

The report soon moves to the (you guessed it) internet;

The police service must be able to deal with the consequences of harmful information that spreads rapidly online. This is an area that the police service and the Government must prioritise. If they implement these recommendations successfully, they would improve how the police gather and assess intelligence, respond to harmful online content and investigate disorder.

I’m not surprised the HMICFRS conflates responding to ‘harmful online content’ with the investigation of disorder (although the report later, unwittingly, reveals its disingenuousness). Yes, OSINT and SOCMINT is an important part of the mix, but by no means a silver bullet. The police shouldn’t blame ‘the internet’ for their own wholly predictable intelligence failures.

I saw how policing ended up relying on social media monitoring for intelligence gathering, with varying degrees of success. Indeed, I worked on two such units circa 2013-2014. The units were shiny and new, occasionally attracting careerists looking for glory rather than efficacy. They were also seduced by IT companies peddling data aggregators and social media monitoring tools. I knew it was time to bail out when a Middle Eastern delegation was given a tour of our office - we were showing off our ‘expertise’ to autocracies.

As a former old-school SB officer, I remember sitting in front of a screen watching multiple Twitter feeds. I remember how much cheaper it was to pay an informant before an event than it was putting a dozen coppers in a room with hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of IT equipment during the event. Social media consists of a thousand haystacks in which to lose a pin – give me carefully deployed eyes on the street any day of the week. Of course, the best approach involves the judicious use of both techniques, but senior officers demand their crystal ball. Less risk, right?

As for ethics? An important question, which I’ll answer with another; is it more ethical (a) to monitor a small group of people you suspect planning disorder, or (b) monitoring everyone online, all of the time? And to think senior police officers seem incapable of making a public statement without including the word proportionality. Then they arrest people for making harmless comments on ‘X’.

Jesus wept.

The lack of ‘tribal memory’ in policing is appalling. Oh, and I was once told off for using the word ‘tribal’, too. It’s insulting to indigenous peoples or something.

I know.

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The report also demonstrates institutional amnesia;

The absence of a police intelligence network to specifically deal with disorder is a problem.

I worked on at least three or four such networks, before they were all disbanded. I’m sure a few chief officers remember giving the orders. They must have forgotten their complicity when the HMICRFS came calling. Did I mention the crisis in police leadership, one where hardly anyone applies to lead a police force these days? The report continues, reading at times like a Joseph Heller novel;

The police service needs to have a better intelligence strategy or plan in place. At a time of national emergency, this plan should be clear and obvious to all. Instead, as one senior intelligence officer described, the police service “wrote the manual as it happened.”

Imagine any other organisation failing at such an epic level without any repercussions for those leading it? Writing the manual as it happened? I feel sorry for the poor bastards behind the riot shields, personally. They were thoroughly let down. Then, as if it couldn’t get any worse? It’s time for the scary music played when Darth Vader appears in a Star Wars movie;

The NPCC (National Police Chief’s Council) asked for the Government’s open source intelligence capacity and capability and its counter disinformation cell (which operated during the General Election) to be made available. The aim was to help the police manage the effects of illegal or harmful online content. This was the right thing to do because the police service needed help.

The counter disinformation cell is a not-at-all sinister civil service unit responsible for social media sentiment monitoring. Think countering evil, Russian-sponsored theories about, er, Covid originating from a Chinese biowarfare clinic (crazy, huh?). The last line, ‘this was the right thing to do’ was inserted, I suspect, to deflect the anticipated criticism of using the CDC.

I predict mission creep. We’re heading down a road of digital anarcho-tyranny (i.e. it will be more politically salient for police forces to chase ‘problematic’ content in the name of ‘social cohesion’ than track online fraudsters and so on). Don’t say you weren’t warned.

Which brings me to this;

We conclude that the causes of the widespread disorder were extremely complex… some people, including politicians, and many media outlets have suggested that the disorder was the result of well-organised and co-ordinated action by extremist groups. Others stated that the disorder was caused by deliberate, targeted disinformation from a variety of sources. However, we found that the causal factors were more complex than were initially evident.

More complex. Yes, they were. So why focus on the internet? The vacuum caused by police and CPS obfuscation of what happened in Southport was the causal factor of the riots. This obfuscation was caused primarily by sensitivities around race and immigration. It’s similar to the Labour Government’s prevarication over the Rape Gang scandal.

What is clear, in common with the recent policing history of disorder, is that an unprecedented event triggered the initial disorder…

Put whoever wrote that in an intelligence unit!

…in this case, the murders of three young girls in Southport, compounded by some of the harmful online reporting that followed. The volume of this online content, and the overwhelming speed at which it was shared, further influenced widespread disorder. It served as a call to arms for large groups of disillusioned people.

Which is why Starmer was, frankly, talking out of his fundament. There were no Moscow-funded, SS-fixated skinheads planning riots. Nonetheless, the dog has a bone. The Internet. And it won’t let go.

The police service hasn’t kept up with the challenges of online content The police service simply hasn’t kept pace with the fast-developing nature of online communications. In general, forces haven’t invested enough in resources and technology. This means many forces have limited capability to effectively manage and respond to online content.

Huh? British policing has no money. Force IT contracts are farcical. Establishing effective online intelligence units requires a commitment to staffing, training and career development senior officers cannot begin to comprehend. They also think its possible to hire experienced online investigators and IT ninjas for 30-odd grand a year (the NCA is especially hilarious when it comes to this, thinking working for ‘The British FBI’ is enough of a reward).

The police service hasn’t fully responded to recommendations made in a variety of previous inspection reports and reviews. As a result, at the time of the disorder it hadn’t sufficiently developed its capability to effectively respond to online content.

I just threw this in to demonstrate the culture of hypocrisy that exists at the top of policing. If the average chief constable ordered a review in their own force with the same lack of action? There’d be hell to pay. Instead, there’ll be King’s Police Medals and promotions in the ever-failing-upwards world of the NPCC.

There is some good stuff, though;

The police service can’t fully control or counter the speed and volume of online content, whether the content is legitimate or presents a risk. They must be robust in countering online content that contains misinformation or disinformation… the police service must communicate the facts. Repeatedly, continuously and effectively as circumstances change and develop. If not, others will take over the narrative with overwhelming amounts of online content.

I agree completely. This echoes the the ever-sensible Jonathan Hall, KC. The irony about Southport? The police created the problem via poor media ops. They blamed this on the CPS, but how hard did the police push the lawyers? Was the CPS’s caution purely due to concerns around a fair trial?

The report highlights another problem dogging post-9/11 police intelligence gathering, whereby counterterrorism washed its hands of domestic extremism and public order intelligence;

The police service needs to improve how it classifies and collects intelligence on disorder. The police service categorises the risks associated with public order and public safety under ten themes. Those most likely to lead to disorder include “cultural nationalism”, “anti-fascism” and “internationally inspired activity”. The police service also uses terms such as “domestic extremism” and “aggravated activism” to describe the behaviour of individuals and groups who may pose a risk to public safety. We are concerned that having too many categories creates a lack of clarity on the requirement for intelligence on disorder.

Precisely so. This new, and entirely unnecessary, level of complexity also creates intelligence gaps. A diaphanous veil exists between terrorism, domestic political extremism and ‘public order.’ Putting them in silos was a mistake. With this in mind, I would suggest it’s now time to rethink the post 9/11 CT policing settlement.

Oddball, to extremist, to terrorist; David Copeland, the infamous neo-Nazi bomber, moved through the ‘mainstream’ far right on his radicalisation journey.

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The HMICFRS report recognises this;

The police service needs to improve its approach to managing intelligence on disorder. The police service takes a different approach to intelligence on terrorism than intelligence on disorder. It comes as no surprise to us that the rising tide of intelligence on disorder was missed before the disorder in 2024. We fully understand that intelligence on terrorism is a priority. But other national risks should still receive attention.

Sadly, as we have seen, chief officers have a poor record when it comes to acting on HMICFRS reports.

Then there’s the obvious one. The biggie. The cornerstone of British policing, which is well-trained, resourceful, streetwise officers knowing who the wrong ‘uns are on their patch;

Neighbourhood policing has a vital role in gathering intelligence on disorder A successful approach to gathering intelligence on the risk from disorder starts with neighbourhood policing. The work of the police is most effective when local officers build strong working relationships with local authorities, other partner organisations and local communities. This helps them to appreciate public sentiments and the risk of disorder.

I would also mention my ongoing suggestion we devolve CT intelligence functions to as low a level as possible, to fully support local policing. To hear ‘the dogs on the street’ barking. Not tweeting, right?

We learned that at the start of August 2024, soon after events in Southport, the police service set up Operation Shadow to try and identify people and groups inciting or co-ordinating disorder at a national level. Operation Shadow was led by the Eastern regional organised crime unit (ROCU) and co-ordinated intelligence and suspect identification work carried out by the National Crime Agency, ROCUs and Counter Terrorism Policing. The operation cross-checked databases and investigations to identify individuals and groups presenting the greatest risk. It included an assessment of individuals and groups likely to be violent and with access to firearms. We heard the operation didn’t identify any people that met this threshold.

I’m sure my police and former police readers will be familiar with this ‘form a squad’ mentality. As a police intelligence monkey, I’ve written threat assessments, based on entirely reliable sources, which were subsequently ignored. When our intelligence was proved to be correct, and the shit hit the fan, the powers-that-be formed a squad. This squad would eventually discover the truth behind the problem (as per the intelligence assessment) was far less glamorous / sinister and - most importantly - offered inadequate evidential opportunities for criminal proceedings. I’ve worked with otherwise excellent detectives who made poor intelligence officers - they too often conflated ‘success’ with names on charge sheets. Not preventing trouble in the first place.

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My conclusions?

1. Starmer’s narrative around Southport was, and I’m being polite, at best wishful thinking. At worst? Bullshit. Sometimes, you have to read the small print; the left-wing campaign group Hope Not Hate (who’ve previous when it comes to misinformation) is credited as an organisation consulted by the HMICFRCS. Hope Not Hate, its critics suggest, has a tendency to over-egg the threat from far right extremism. Therefore, despite their input, the report found no evidence of a sinister fascist plot? I rest my case, Sir Keir.

2. It would be easier, cheaper and more effective to bring all aspects of public order and extremism intelligence back under the CT umbrella, even though it technically isn’t terrorism. This is an issue of internal police politics and, when you think about it, semantics. Simply have each force or region create a ‘police terrorism and security group’ and have done with it.

3. For the love of God, bring back police stations, decent patrol officers and a consistent police footprint in troubled communities. That’s easily sixty percent of the job done right there.

4. Then devolve elements of the police terrorism and security group’s functions to local policing. Bake it into the mainstream. If you need a template, have a look at the pre-1998 RUC model.

5. The police need to begin integrating media operations into CT work. They need to factor the role of countering misinformation after a significant event (the police call them ‘Critical Incidents’) as soon as practicable. Police media ops need to learn from the military (CIMIC and what used to be the MOG, etc). Why? Because transparency kills lies. At Southport, the authorities fed the online monster. Deny it food and it will die. Anyone who still wants to take to the street after that? Well, have at them.

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The problem of the ‘English Street’ isn’t going away. The police we expect to keep a lid on it are unequipped and unprepared for the task - something His Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary fully identifies in this report.

Yet my concerns are straightforward - the Home Office and NPCC will decide the internet is the scapegoat. The low-hanging fruit. Blame everything on bots and Russians and online Nazis. To show they’re ‘doing something’, they’ll throw resources and legislation at online content.

The collateral damage?

Free speech. Police forces have shown themselves, time and time again, of being incapable of responsibly dealing with these matters. I’ll say it again, for any senior coppers sitting in the cheap seats. I expect to be able to say, short of committing any unambiguously criminal offences, what the fuck I like on the internet without Old Bill knocking on my door.

Of course, the harder path is the most effective; start policing again. Train police officers properly. Start gathering intelligence. Start talking to people. Yes, use social media monitoring as a key intelligence development (and evidential) tool. Sadly, the COP working groups, thrusting police HQ portfolio builders and agenda-driven civil servants will see little profit in such an approach. Not while the guy in charge remains convinced the problem’s due to online fascists living rent-free in his head.

Meanwhile, in the real world, the Street will continue to seethe. Will we, eventually, witness a ‘British Spring?’

If we did, I suspect it would be ugly.

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Thanks for reading. FYI, I wrote this piece for the guys over at the Pimlico Journal. It’s an essay in two parts; the first a potted history of police evisceration, from the early 90s to Theresa May. The second part (yet to be published) offers possible solutions.

I’ll be back soon. Oh yes, I will!

Have a great weekend, wherever you are.

Dom